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Abstract
Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of
whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social
epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations
from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we
also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
Disagreements are numerous in this world. There are disagreements aboutmatters of
taste: some people like minimalist art while others do not; some like oysters, others
detest them. However, the scope of disagreement extends beyond the realm of the
subjective, well into the realm of the objective. People disagree for instance about
matters political—should taxes be raised?—religious—does God exist?—philosophi-
cal—do we have freedom of the will?—and scientific—is the universe infinite?
While it is fairly uncontroversial that people disagree in a variety of areas of
thought, there is an interesting normative question concerning the epistemic sta-
tus of such disagreements. More specifically, the question has been raised whether
there can ever be rational disagreements among agents who take each other to be
epistemic peers on a certain question. To say that a number of agents are epistemic
peers concerning a question, Q, is to say, first, that they are equally well positioned
evidentially with respect to Q, second, that they have considered Q with equal care,
and, third, that they are equally gifted with intellectual virtues, cognitive skills and
the like.1 For epistemic peers to rationally disagree onQ is for them to justifiably hold
different doxastic attitudes concerning Q.2 Finally, of special interest in the debate
on peer disagreement is the question whether epistemic peers can rationally sustain
a disagreement after full disclosure, that is, once they have shared all their relevant
evidence as well as announced the respective doxastic attitudes they arrived at.
1This characterization of the notion of epistemic peer can be found in nearly all recent contributions
to the debate about the possibility of rational disagreements. See, e.g., Kelly [2005], Feldman [2006],
[2007], Christensen [2007], Douven [2009], [2010], and Goldman [2010].
2For present purposes, “doxastic attitude” denotes either outright belief, outright disbelief, or sus-
pension of judgment. Some (e.g., Christensen [2007] and Elga [2007]) have preferred a treatment in
terms of degrees of confidence. As will be seen, some of the arguments presented here carry over to
the alternative treatment.
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A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answers to these ques-
tions are negative. In this paper, we point to considerations from the history of
science that provide at least some reason for answering the question in the positive.
However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
1. Scientific disagreements. Considerations from the history of science led Thomas
Kuhn [1965:262] to claim that “variability of judgment may . . . be essential to scien-
tific advance.” A crucial way in which such variability may matter has to do with the
fact that what we perceive tends to be influenced by our expectations, which in turn
depend on our theoretical presumptions.3 Observations that are odds with these pre-
sumptions may therefore simply be overlooked. Moreover, even if observations are
not overlooked, they may be dismissed as misleading, perhaps due to measurement
errors or confounding factors.
The first point is nicely illustrated by a psychological experiment that Kuhn de-
scribes in his [1962/1996:62ff]. In this experiment, subjects were shown series of
playing cards, displayed one at a time, most of which were normal, but some of which
were not; for instance, there was a red six of spades and a black four of hearts. While
the normal cards were all categorized as such, the abnormal cards were usually cat-
egorized as normal as well. When asked, participants who had been shown the black
four of hearts would either say that they had seen the four of hearts or the four of
spades. As Kuhn points out, this tendency to see what one expects to see manifests
itself in science as well. For example, Uranus had been observed many times before
it was “officially” discovered as a planet, but on all those previous occasions it had
been categorized as a star (even though with hindsight one would say that, from the
celestial object’s movements, it should have been clear that it was not a star).
The history of thinking about peptic ulcer disease in the community of medical
researchers provides an equally nice illustration of the second point. It is currently
accepted that peptic ulcer disease is caused by a bacterial infection. However, for a
long time, evidence suggesting as much was simply dismissed, due to the fact that
medical researchers had been largely convinced by a single, and as later turned out
poorly conducted, study that seemed to indicate that no bacteria were to be found
in the stomachs of patients suffering from the disease.4
So, a certain diversity in the views held by scientists would seem to increase
the chances of scientific progress by decreasing the chance that some—potentially
crucial—evidence is missed by all groups of researchers.
There are further reasons in favor of this kind of epistemic diversity in the scien-
tific community. As Kuhn [1977:332] observes, before a scientific community decides
to accept a new theory, that theory “has been tested over time by the research of a
number of men, some working within it, others within its traditional rival,” and, he
then argues, “[s]uch a mode of development . . . requires a decision process which
permits rational men to disagree . . . .” In a similar vein, Popper [1975:87] suggests
that
3A point that was also forcefully argued for in Hanson [1958].
4See Thagard [1998a], [1998b] for a detailed account of the development of thinking about peptic
ulcer disease.
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A limited amount of dogmatism is necessary for progress. Without a serious
struggle for survival in which the old theories are tenaciously defended, none of
the competing theories can show their mettle.
Being challenged by one’s peers, be it directly—because they question one’s own
theory—or indirectly—because they put forth a rival theory—helps to think hard
about the comparative virtues and vices of one’s theory. More generally, it might
be said that this kind of disagreement flags pressing research problems and thereby
focuses research and attracts the attention of new scientists.5
The variability of judgment Kuhn points at, as well as the dogmatism and tena-
cious defense Popper deems necessary for progress, would probably be irrational
if disagreements among peers were generally irrational. Surely, however, it would
go too far to dismiss as irrational what—assuming the above authors are right—are
necessary conditions for scientific progress.
In fact, much the same considerations may apply to areas other than science—
such as, for instance, philosophy and politics—in that disagreements may contribute
to intellectual progress in these areas as well.6 From an epistemic point of view, then,
it is a good thing that participants to debates in these areas disagree. What is more,
it is a good thing for them to do so even once they are appraised of the fact that
some of their colleagues, whom they consider peers, have contrary beliefs. If William
Alston [1985:70] is right and to have justification for a belief just is for it to be a good
thing from an epistemic point of view, then the above considerations provide reason
to believe that rational peer disagreement is possible.
On the other hand, it has recently been argued that there is a sense in which
it is impossible to rationally sustain disagreements—at least after full disclosure.
Suppose pro and con are both leading experts in some field of research. While they
both take each other to be peers on a certain question, Q, they disagree on what the
correct answer to this question is. pro thinks it is P , con thinks it is (something
entailing) the negation of P .7 There is a powerful intuition that the rational thing to
do here is to suspend judgment on Q and, correlatively, not rational to continue to
believe as they do.8 This intuition is backed by the observation that if the parties
to the disagreement were entitled to hold on to their respective beliefs, they would
also be entitled to discount their opponent’s opinion simply on the grounds that
a disagreement has occurred. Certainly, however, there exists no such entitlement.
One cannot discount the opinion of someone one takes to be a peer on some question
simply on the basis that a disagreement has occurred.9
Does the difference between the two views boil down to a difference over what
constitutes epistemic justification? Recall that we used Alston’s conception, accord-
ing to which justification is what is good from an epistemic point of view, to argue
5See on this also Lugg [1978:286 f].
6It is not clear that those considerations apply quite generally. We expect from scientists that they
are able to critically reflect upon their own proposals. We do not have the same expectation of, say,
religious people.
7Notice that this is not the only way in which two agents can disagree. After all, it may also be that
one agent suspends judgment while the other holds a belief (disbelief). For convenience’s sake, we will
often restrict our focus to cases in which the parties to the disagreement hold contrary beliefs.
8This view has been defended by Richard Feldman (see his [2005], [2006], [2007], [2009]). The corre-
sponding view that those who have treated the issue in terms of degrees of confidence is the so-called
equal weight view, which requires that one give equal weight to the opinion of a peer (Elga [2007:478]).
9This, we take it, is the core point of Elga’s [2007, Sect. 10] bootstrapping argument.
3
that the doxastic attitudes of disagreeing peers can both be justified. As opposed to
that, the above argument appeals to the absence of an entitlement—of an epistemic
permission—to discount one’s peer’s opinion. Thus, this argument appears to pre-
suppose a deontological conception of justification, according to which justification
depends on what the agent is epistemically permitted to believe. We would not want
the difference between the two views to boil down to a difference in conceptions of
epistemic justification. In particular, we think that the fact that it is good, from an
epistemic point of view, for the parties to a disagreement to hold on to their beliefs
will support a claim to the justifiability of these beliefs only if it is strong enough to
generate an epistemic permission to do so. In what follows we will show how this
can be done.10
2. The dynamic approach. To begin with, notice that the problem of rational peer
disagreement is typically stated as a static one typically involving two peers who share
the same evidence yet hold different doxastic attitudes and know this to be the case.
We agree that in the static setup, there is a strong intuition that upon discovering that
one’s peer holds a different doxastic attitude, one should move one’s own attitude in
the direction of the peer’s. At the same time, at least for the types of disagreement
presently under consideration, the static setup is highly unrealistic. It is much more
plausible to assume that such disagreements are generated, sustained and resolved
in a continuous exchange of reasons and arguments. Otherwise put, a more realistic
setup of the problem is dynamic. What we will show is that abandoning the static
setup in favor of the dynamic setup of the problem already renders the idea that
there can be rational disagreements among peers much more plausible.
Let us start spelling out the dynamic setup of the problem by distinguishing be-
tween two types of rounds. In the first type of round, each agent may gather new
evidence and evaluates his epistemic state. We will refer to rounds of this kind as
deliberative rounds. In the second type of round, each agent discloses the relevant
reasons and arguments as well as the conclusion (the doxastic attitude) of the last
deliberative round. Rounds of this type shall be labeled disclosive. A debate or dis-
pute can then be understood as a series of rounds starting from a deliberative one,
D0, and then alternating between disclosive—D1, D3, etc.—and deliberative—D2, D4,
etc.—rounds. We have a disagreement at a round, Di , just in case at least two par-
ties hold different doxastic attitudes at Di . For simplicity’s sake, we will assume (i)
that the participants to the dispute deliberate and disclose simultaneously, (ii) that,
in disclosive rounds, each party to the dispute is exposed to what the other parties
have to say, and (iii) that there is the relevant uptake on the part of the parties. For
any i ∈ {2,4,6, . . .}, each party’s epistemic state in deliberative round Di will include
the evidence that led to the formation of the doxastic attitude, the fact that the other
parties to the debate hold a certain doxastic attitude, and that they do so on the basis
of a number of considerations they take to support their doxastic attitude as well as
any further evidence gathered during the round.
It is far from clear that at the end of a given deliberative round, disagreeing peers
epistemically ought to suspend judgment. On the contrary, intuitively, one will be
entitled to hold onto one’s doxastic attitude provided one
10Notice that we are not alone in favoring this alternative. Among its more prominent champions are
Gideon Rosen [2001], Peter van Inwagen [1996], and Ralph Wedgwood [2007].
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(S1) finds reasons to resist the peer’s case in favour of his conclusion, and/or
(S2) discovers new evidence in support of one’s own belief, and/or
(S3) is able to explain how one’s peer could have become involved in error.
In many disputes, certainly in many philosophical ones, the parties to the dispute
will combine a number of these strategies at any deliberative round. The results are
then presented in the ensuing disclosive round and the disputants’ epistemic states
will be expanded by the relevant facts about their peer’s beliefs as they move on to
the next deliberative round. It can easily be seen how any number of peers may be
able to sustain a disagreement rationally over an extended number of rounds. At
least in this sense, we claim, epistemic peers can sustain rational disagreements.
3. Objections and replies. Some might object to our account of the possibility of
rational peer disagreement along the following lines: It is not the case that when the
disputants enter a deliberative round, they are entitled to hold onto their doxastic
attitudes. Rather, in view of the fact that they are having a disagreement with some-
one they take to be a peer, they ought to suspend judgment at least until they have
evaluated the evidence again. After all, not doing so amounts to dismissing, even if
only temporarily, a peer’s opinion simply on the grounds that a disagreement has
occurred. And, it has already been pointed out, this cannot permissibly be done.
There are a number of points we would like to make by way of response to this
objection. To begin with, it is far from clear that this objection can retain full cogency
in the dynamic setup. There are ways of spelling out the details of the case in such a
way as to allow the participants to the dispute to hold onto their doxastic attitudes
whilst not discounting their peers’ opinions in this objectionable way. Here is one
way in which this can be done. Suppose the agents’ communication procedure is
highly ritualized: At each deliberative round agents put their reasons/arguments
and conclusions into writing. Copies of all pieces are distributed to each agent who
upon completion of reading them enters the next deliberative round. The only access
to the other agents’ thoughts is through the copies of the written work distributed
at disclosive rounds. Suppose upon reading their peers’ works, each agent comes to
have a strong intuition that something is wrong with the peers’ arguments. Suppose,
furthermore, that these intuitions are borne out: each agent manages to find reasons
to resist their peers’ case against their own preferred view. In this situation, it seems
quite plausible that the intuition entitles the agents to hold on to their own doxastic
attitudes even at the beginning of a deliberative round. (Certainly, the force of this
intuition cannot be neutralized by the fact that the peers have a parallel intuition,
as one cannot access this fact until the next disclosive round.) In this setup, again,
disagreements can be rationally sustained among epistemic peers.
Of course, it is not hard to see how to extend the lesson this case suggests to cases
in which agents communicate in more familiar ways. If, for instance, the agents’ rel-
evant computational powers were sufficiently increased, they may see straightaway
what, according to them, is wrong with their peer’s argument. In this case, again, it
looks as though rational disagreement among peers is possible. The cases thus sug-
gest that rational peer disagreement can be made possible by adding further details
to the description of the relevant cases such as the communication procedure or the
agents’ computational powers.
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We take it that these cases establish the possibility of rational peer disagreement.
What they do not establish, however, is that there can be rational disagreements
among normal human peers, who do not communicate in the ritualized way and who
are not gifted with computational superpowers.11 We shall remedy this shortcoming
now. To begin with, consider two types of database that are designed to store asmany
truths about a certain subject matter as possible. They can acquire new data either by
interacting with other databases or else by having them entered independently. The
first type is designed not to allow conflicts between stored data and data acquired by
other databases. As soon as the conflict arises it moves to a state of suspension of
judgment and then reevaluates the totality of the data. As opposed to that, the second
type is designed to allow in principle for such conflicts but to work towards resolving
them when they arise. Is one of the two types of database rationally preferable to
the other? Some reason to think that the answer is no here is that, on the face of it,
both types of database may well be equally likely to get the job done.12
In view of this case, one may start to wonder whether what really matters here is
that, upon entering a deliberative round, one suspends judgment rather than contin-
ues to believe. Our suspicion is that it is not. Accordingly, we do not find it a priori
problematic to grant agents a permission to hold onto their beliefs when entering
a deliberative round. Rather, what really matters is that one does not continue to
believe unless one manages to engage with one’s peers’ views in a satisfactory man-
ner. For that reason the permission to continue to believe should not be granted
“willynilly.” Tied to it are (at least) the following duties:
(D1) A duty towards one’s peers to engage with their views (for instance, in one of
the ways outlined in (S1)–(S3) above).
(D2) A duty to suspend judgment if it turns out that one cannot adequately discharge
the duty stated in (D1).
It becomes clear that, on this view, the parties to rational peer disagreements do
not discount their opponents’ views simply on the basis that a disagreement has oc-
curred. Rather, they discount them conditional on engaging with them in satisfactory
ways and will move to suspension of judgment if they fail to do so.
For these reasons we believe that there is no a priori reason against granting
parties to a disagreement the permission to continue to hold onto their doxastic
attitudes when entering a deliberative round. At the same time, we think that what
the agent ought to believe upon entering a deliberative round may hinge on further a
posteriori facts. To see this, suppose, first, that (some of) the agents involved are so
constituted that they easily lose interest in a question once they suspend judgment
on it, but will continue to think very hard about the matter so long as they continue
to hold a belief. Alternatively, suppose that the agent community will lose interest
in the question if one particular member does and this latter agent is constituted as
described above. (Consider: The head of a research group loses interest in a certain
question and as a result so does the rest of the group.) Since, the agents will make no
11For the record, we think that scholarly disputes often approximate the ritualized way of communi-
cation closely enough.
12Notice that the two databases differ from the communities of agents modelled in Douven [2010],
which adopt different policies to deal with disagreements, to wit, “sticking to their guns” and “splitting
the difference,” respectively. After all, even the tension-resolving database may come to the conclusion
that the right thing to do is to split the difference.
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progress on arriving at the truth on the question unless they continue to think about
it, their holding on to their doxastic attitudes may well be the thing to do here.13
On the other hand, suppose that the agents involved are prone to take their peers’
views more lightheartedly if they hold onto their beliefs, whilst, at the same time,
their continued interest is not dependent on their continued believing. In this case,
it would seem that suspension of judgment (upon entering a deliberative round) is
what the agents ought to do. Of course, these are just two types of a posteriori fact
that play a part in determining whether, in the situations under consideration, a given
agent ought to continue to believe or suspend judgment. Other types of fact may play
a part as well. Moreover, things must not be expected to fall as neatly into place as
they do in the toy examples. Interest comes in degrees as does taking opponents’
views lightheartedly. Accordingly, it must be expected that the various factors will
have to be weighed against each other on a case-by-case basis to determine whether,
in the types of situation under consideration, a given agent ought to continue to
believe or suspend judgment. So, while we think that there is no a priori reason
to deny parties to a peer disagreement the permission to hold onto their doxastic
attitudes, there will be a host of a posteriori facts that will be of vital importance
here. Crucially, however, the a posteriori facts can go both ways. As a result, our
case for the possibility of rational peer disagreement even among normal human
beings remains in good standing.
4. Other types of disagreement. It is noteworthy that the problem concerning the
epistemic status of disagreements is typically understood as a specific problem con-
cerning cases of disagreement among equal numbers of agents (typically two) who are
and/or take each other to be peers. Before closing, we would like tomake some points
regarding disagreements among unequal numbers of agents and among agents who
are not and do not take each other to be peers.
Let us start with a case in which there is a disagreement among unequal parties
of agents who all take each other to be peers. To take an extreme example, suppose
that the large party, L, counts a hundred members while the small one, S, consists
of a single agent. Suppose, next, that, in a disclosive round, S presents an argument
suggesting that L is mistaken. Surely, the members of L ought not dismiss this argu-
ment simply on the basis that they do not agree with its conclusion. After all, even
large groups of people can be mistaken. Similarly, suppose someone one considers
one’s inferior on a given question presents one with an argument suggesting that
one is mistaken. In this situation, one ought not dismiss this argument simply on the
basis that one does not agree with it either. After all, the epistemically most superior
among us are fallible and even the epistemically vastly inferior can have lucky breaks.
These cases suggest that the sorts of consideration that have driven some to
deny the possibility of rational disagreement among equal parties of peers can be
adapted to support parallel conclusions for disagreements among unequal parties of
peers and disagreements among non-peers. Contrary to what appears to be received
wisdom, the problem of rational peer disagreement is not specific to peers—never
mind to equal parties of peers—after all.
13This point is very much in line with the results presented Douven [2010], which stresses the impor-
tance of contingent facts to the rationality of disagreements.
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The present dynamic approach to the problem of peer disagreement can handle
these other types of disagreement, too. In fact, it can provide a uniform account for
all of these types of disagreement, namely, the parties involved can rationally sustain
disagreements over a series of rounds, for instance, if all parties successfully deploy
some of the strategies (S1)–(S3) mentioned above. Moreover, there is no a priori
problem with granting the parties a permission to continue to believe provided that
they discharge the relevant duties (including (D1) and (D2)). At the same time, a
posteriori facts may generate obligations to react to the disagreement in a specific
way. All of this holds equally for the type of case that has been the focus in the
literature and the variations currently under consideration.
This, we claim, is a benefit of the dynamic approach. After all, intuitively, there can
be rational disagreements of the kinds described. Regarding disagreements among
unequal parties of peers consider disagreements among scientists before a paradigm
shift. Intuitively, the scientists who accept the new paradigm are often rational in so
doing even when they are by far outnumbered by disagreeing peers. For instance, in-
tuitively, Copernicus was rational in accepting the heliocentric system even when the
vast majority of his peers disagreed with him. Regarding disagreements among non-
peers, consider disagreements among current leading figures on a certain question
and the most promising young scholars. While the leading figure may be generally
regarded as the young scholar’s superior—if only because he has had much more
time to think about the issue and become acquainted with the relevant literature—a
disagreement between them may still be rational. A nice illustration of this is pro-
vided by De Regt [1996], who describes the dispute between Maxwell and Boltzmann
about Boltzmann’s explanation of a certain anomaly—the specific heat anomaly, as
it was called—in the kinetic theory of gases. Maxwell, the leading figure in the field,
and Boltzmann, who was Maxwell’s junior by thirteen years, both stuck to their guns
in their exchange about the anomaly.
The dynamic approach can make sense of how Maxwell and Boltzmann can have
been—and more generally how parties to the designated type of disagreements can
be—rational in their respective beliefs in the way sketched above. It thus secures
an additional advantage over a number of alternative approaches to the problem of
disagreement—most notably, of course, over those that claim that rational disagree-
ments are impossible even among equal parties of peers.14
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